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Non-Technical Summary
Dynamic market environments and consumer preferences demand firms to assure a high
degree of flexibility. At the same time, competitive pressure from globalized markets leads
to constantly raising efficiency requirements. Organizations change their design from static
to dynamic concepts in order to react adequately to these developments and challenges. A
common strategy is to reach beyond the boundaries of the firm to access critical resources.
Accordingly, we observe that technology transfer from providers of knowledge intensive
business services attracts more and more attention.
A specific case is the external supply of information technology. A major reason why
firms outsource IT, is the potential to cut cost. We argue that there is also a potential of
knowledge transfer in IT outsourcing relationships, leading to client-side innovation. The
aim of this paper is to contribute to resolving an empirical puzzle arising from the prior
literature. Some authors find beneficial effects of IT outsourcing, others underline that
firms often fail to achieve their expected strategic goals.
Our stylized theoretical model combines a knowledge production function framework
and transaction cost economics. We hypothesize that the right balance between internal
and external knowledge is critical for innovation. The empirical application is German
firm-level data covering a wide range of industries from 2003 to 2006. Our results largely
support the theoretical arguments and suggest a positive linear relationship between the
level of outsourcing and process innovation. For product innovation we find a hump-shape,
indicating a positive relationship only up to a tipping point. Partial outsourcing seems to
be more beneficial than complete outsourcing.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Unternehmen agieren in zunehmend dynamischen Ma¨rkten. Dies verlangt ein hohes Maß
an Flexibilita¨t, wobei gleichzeitig der globale Wettbewerb zu Effizienz zwingt. Um auf
diese Entwicklungen und Herausforderungen ada¨quat reagieren zu ko¨nnen, setzen Un-
ternehmen auf eine dynamische Organisationsstruktur. Eine verbreitete Strategie ist dabei
Ressourcen außerhalb der Unternehmensgrenzen zu nutzen. In diesem Sinne spielt Tech-
nologietransfer von Anbietern wissensintensiver Dienstleistungen, wie zum Beispiel Infor-
mationstechnologie, eine immer wichtigere Rolle.
Der klassische Grund, warum Unternehmen IT Dienste auslagern, ist ein Einsparungs-
potenzial. Im vorliegendem Papier stellen wir jedoch einen potenziellen Wissenstransfer in
den Fokus und untersuchen ob IT Outsourcing Auswirkungen auf die Innovationsta¨tigkeit
auf Kundenseite haben kann. In diesem Zusammenhang versuchen wir dazu beizutragen,
augenscheinlich widerspru¨chliche Ergebnisse empirischer Studien in Einklang zu bringen:
Wa¨hrend einige Autoren zeigen ko¨nnen, dass IT Outsourcing zu Produktivita¨tssteigerung
fu¨hrt, heben andere hervor, dass oft langfristige strategische Ziele verfehlt werden.
In einem stilisierten theoretischen Modell kombinieren wir den Ansatz der Wissenspro-
duktionsfunktion mit Transaktionskosteno¨konomik. Die zentrale Hypothese ist, dass eine
Steigerung der Innovationsta¨tigkeit vom richtigen Verha¨ltnis von internem zu externem
Wissen abha¨ngt. Die empirische Untersuchung basiert auf einem Datensatz deutscher Un-
ternehmen unterschiedlichster Branchen, der Informationen von 2003 bis 2006 abdeckt.
Die Ergebnisse besta¨tigen die theoretische Argumentation weitestgehend. Wir ko¨nnen
zeigen, dass es einen linear-positiven Zusammenhang zwischen dem Grad an Outsourc-
ing und Prozessinnovation gibt. Der Zusammenhang zwischen Outsourcing und Pro-
duktinnovation ist umgekehrt-U-fo¨rmig, das heißt Outsourcing erho¨ht die Innovations-
wahrscheinlichkeit nur bis zu einem bestimmten Punkt. Teilweises Outsourcing scheint in
diesem Fall vorteilhafter als vollsta¨ndiges Outsourcing.
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Abstract
Flexibility in response to competitive pressure from globalized markets and increas-
ingly individualized customer desires has become vital for firms. A common strategy
to address this challenge is to employ a dynamic concept of organization and reach
beyond the boundaries of the firm. Accordingly, technology transfer from providers
of knowledge intensive business services attracts more and more attention. In this
context we focus on external supply of information technology and client-side innova-
tion. The aim of this paper is to contribute to resolving an empirical puzzle arising
from the prior literature. Some authors find beneficial effects of IT outsourcing, others
underline that firms often fail to achieve expected strategic goals. Our stylized theo-
retical model combines a knowledge production function framework and transaction
cost economics. We hypothesize that the right balance between internal and external
knowledge is critical for innovation. The empirical application is German firm-level
data covering a wide range of industries from 2003 to 2006. Our results largely support
the theoretical arguments and suggest a positive linear relationship between the level
of outsourcing and process innovation. For product innovation we find a hump-shape.
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1 Introduction
Make-or-buy decisions have a long history. For example, already in the ancient Roman
Empire tax collection was given in private hands (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2002, p.
189). Hence, long before the Industrial Revolution, division of labor has been identified
as a source of efficiency enhancement. The literature has addressed this question from
a variety of perspectives. One approach is to look at models of two regions with asym-
metric factor endowments to explain how firms decide on where to locate different stages
of the production process (Krugman, 1991; Antra`s and Helpman, 2004; Grossman and
Helpman, 2005; S¸ener and Zhao, 2009). With the advent of new technologies that ren-
der transportation costs of information negligible, recently also more knowledge-intensive
corporate functions are subject to make-or-buy decisions (Freund and Weinhold, 2002;
Amiti and Wei, 2006). As firms seek flexibility in response to globalized markets and in-
creasingly individualized customer desires, research and development (R&D) services and
most dominantly computer, information and communication technology (ICT) services
are traded (World Trade Organization, 2011). Despite its growing practical relevance,
empirical research on external supply of information technology (IT) is still scarce. An
IT outsourcing paradox persists in the literature: While a number of large scale firm- and
industry-level studies find positive impacts on productivity in the short run (Ohnemus,
2007; Knittel and Stango, 2008; Han et al., forthcoming), client organizations often re-
port to be dissatisfied in terms of long run strategic goals such as innovation (Miozzo and
Grimshaw, 2005; Overby, 2007, 2010; Bacheldor, 2010). Evidence from case-study research
and insights from simulation models suggests that this is due to myopic management and
opportunistic vendor behavior (Barthe´lemy, 2001; Rouse, 2009; Windrum et al., 2009). In
contrast, there is a substantial body of work showing that firms benefit from linkages with
related types of knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) (Bessant and Rush, 1995;
Antonelli, 1998; Muller and Zenker, 2001; Czarnitzki and Spielkamp, 2003; Howells, 2006;
Tether and Tajar, 2008; Huang and Yu, 2011; Go¨rg and Hanley, 2011).
In this paper, we aim to contribute a differentiated explanation for this prevailing
empirical puzzle. We change the focus from cost-cutting to a more strategic perspective by
recognizing IT outsourcing as a source of external knowledge and expertise (Scarbrough,
1998). In a stylized theoretical model we extend the knowledge production framework
with insights from transaction cost economics. Specifically we ask: Can IT outsourcing
impact the innovative capabilities of the client? Our hypothesis is that, depending on the
strategic importance of the service subject to outsourcing, firms face a trade-off between
make and buy. That is, the optimal mix of internal and external knowledge is critical
in order to achieve innovative outcomes (Harrigan, 1984; Arora and Gambardella, 1990;
Audretsch et al., 1996; Piga and Vivarelli, 2004; Afuah, 2001; Cassiman and Veugelers,
2006; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). Among Weigelt and Sarkar’s (2009) paper on vendor-
induced knowledge spillovers, ours is one of the first studies to empirically investigate the
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relationship between IT outsourcing and innovation. The empirical application is German
firm-level data spanning a wide range of industries observed 2003-2006.
We find that IT outsourcing is positively associated with cost-reducing process innova-
tion. The impact on demand-enhancing product innovation is found to be hump-shaped.
External knowledge embodied in IT services seems to positively contribute to client-side
innovation up to a tipping point, after which the relationship becomes steeply decreas-
ing. That is, we can explain negative outcomes with over-outsourcing. The remainder is
structured as follows. We start off with a discussion of the related literature, and present
a stylized theoretical model of outsourcing and innovation. Data and methodology are
described in the next sections, followed by a discussion of our results. Finally, we conclude
and give some directions for further research.
2 Background discussion
According to the information systems literature, we can define IT outsourcing as a “sig-
nificant contribution by external vendors in the physical and/or human resources associ-
ated with the entire or specific components of the IT infrastructure in the user organiza-
tion”(Loh and Venkatraman, 1992, p. 9). Lacity et al. (2009) distinguish three categories
of sourcing decisions: ’total outsourcing’ (at least 80% of the IT budget is represented by
third-party responsibility), ’total insourcing’ (at least 80% of the IT budget is managed
and provided internally) and ’selective sourcing’ (selected IT functions are provided exter-
nally, the remaining 20 to 80% of the budget are provided internally). Ever since Eastman
Kodak decided to hand over its entire data center to IBM in 1989 (Loh and Venkatraman,
1992, p. 8), the market for IT outsourcing has grown extensively in all parts of the world
(Lacity and Willcocks, 2001, p. 2 sq.). In Germany for example, 66 percent of firms
with at least 10 employees have been outsourcing IT activities in 2007. Only Finland and
Denmark have a higher percentage share in the EU15 countries (Eurostat data, see figure
A.1). According to industry analysts, the global outsourcing market had an average size
of $88.4 billion in terms of total contractual value from 2007-2010 (TPI, 2011).
A number of authors have looked at the outsourcing decision from a cost perspective,
suggesting that firms consider outsourcing if expected production cost savings outweigh
transaction costs (Dibbern et al., 2004). These cost savings can come in the form of
vendor buying power in terms of hard- and software, access to specialized human capital,
increased capacity utilization, or fixed cost degression. However, empirical research on
the outcome is still scarce. Some studies find evidence that IT outsourcing is associated
with productivity growth. Ohnemus (2007) for example shows that labor productivity of
German firms that outsource basic IT services is significantly higher compared to non-
outsourcing firms. Han et al.’s (forthcoming) analysis of US industry-level data suggests
an 2-4% increase in productivity. Knittel and Stango (2008) also find a 30% reduction
in operating costs for US cooperative banks. Nevertheless, case study research (Miozzo
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and Grimshaw, 2005) and trade press articles (e.g. Overby, 2007, 2010; Bacheldor, 2010)
report that clients often fail to reach innovation as a long term strategic goal. Only 24%
of 290 respondents to an online survey of subscribers to the CIO magazine indicate that
outsourced activities contributed most to IT innovation (compared to 76% in-house). The
discrepancy between expected and actual outcomes of IT outsourcing, at the same time
with wide diffusion across industries and countries, is what researchers have called the IT
outsourcing paradox.
Based on case study research, Rouse (2009) concludes that this is mainly due to my-
opic management and opportunism. Similarly, Overby (2010) argues that innovation is
expected but often not properly defined, and sometimes not recognized because traditional
business metrics fail to properly measure innovation outcomes. This suggests a trade-off
between cost advantages for (specialized) input and a holdup problem (Klein et al., 1978;
Grossman and Helpman, 2002). The simulation model of organizational innovation by
Windrum et al. (2009) goes in the same direction. They posit that IT radically expands
technical opportunities for the outsourcing of production, and significantly lowers external
coordination costs. A short run consequence of outsourcing is a reduction in the depth of
hierarchy. This results in a reduction of fixed cost and gains in productivity. Accordingly,
because managers have short run objectives this increases the probability that the firm
will choose the outsourcing option again. The firm becomes locked-in to an outsourcing
trajectory. Innovation in the sense of a recombination of organizational activities in re-
sponse to changing business needs then is difficult to achieve as it demands coordination
with the external supplier. The result is a long run productivity decline.
Given such a trade-off, Hecker and Kretschmer (2010) argue that the hold-up effect
dominates unless vendor-side production cost decreasing scale effects increase at an increas-
ing rate. They suggest that this could be the case due to network externalities where the
client’s utility is increasing in the number of other clients of the supplier. Among gains
from modularization, knowledge spillovers can be a type of such network externalities.
Vendors accumulate expertise from the combination of explicit and implicit knowledge
gained in the interaction with other clients (double loop learning), which finally results in
superior solutions to individual problems (Antonelli, 1998). In a sense suppliers can be
seen as “bees cross-pollinating between firms, carrying experiences and ideas from one lo-
cation or context into another” (Bessant and Rush, 1995, p. 102). A relatively large body
of literature supports this argument in related settings. It is found that clients benefit from
linkages with KIBS1, and also KIBS themselves are more innovative compared to firms in
all service sectors (Muller and Doloreux, 2009). Weigelt and Sarkar (2009) explicitly look
at the role of vendors in the innovation adoption of clients in IT outsourcing relationships.
The application is US cooperative banks and electronic banking innovations. The core
finding is similar: Clients contracting a technically and organizationally more experienced
1KIBS are defined as firms from the NACE 72–74 sectors, i.e. Computer and related activities, Research
and development, and Other business services such as Legal services, Accounting, Advertising, etc. (Muller
and Doloreux, 2009).
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vendor have a higher propensity to adopt innovation.
In the following we propose another explanation for the prevailing empirical puzzle.
We argue that the scale of outsourcing is crucial to explain both positive and negative
outcomes. From a theoretical perspective, our work is related to Windrum et al. (2009).
Under certain conditions we can derive similar implications. A central assumption in their
paper is that firms face a binary decision between in-house provision and outsourcing. The
setting of our study allows for a continuum of cooperative (partial) types of outsourcing
decisions. With this, we can replicate the main result that firms are better off without
outsourcing, however only when the specificity of the IT service subject to outsourcing
is sufficiently high. In all other cases we hypothesize a positive effect on outsourcing
compared to in-house provision. From an empirical perspective, the most related papers
are Weigelt and Sarkar (2009) and Grimpe and Kaiser (2010). In contrast to Weigelt
and Sarkar (2009), we focus on the client-side and do not consider vendor characteris-
tics directly. Further, we are able to observe in-house provision, partial and complete
outsourcing. Finally, our dependent variables measure client-induced innovation rather
than adoption of new technology. Grimpe and Kaiser (2010) is related in the sense that
the authors also observe a range of outsourcing decisions. However, the subject is R&D
outsourcing. Interestingly, our analysis partly produces similar results: The main finding
of Grimpe and Kaiser (2010) is that outsourcing exerts a curvilinear relationship with
product innovation. We additionally look at process innovation and find evidence for a
different (increasing) relationship in this case.
3 A stylized model of innovation and outsourcing
From a knowledge perspective, organizations may be characterized as “social communities
in which individual and social expertise is transformed into economically useful prod-
ucts and services by the application of a set of higher-order organizing principles”(Kogut
and Zander, 1992, p. 384). That is, choosing the optimal sourcing strategy implies un-
derstanding IT outsourcing not only “as the product of a decision process, but, more
fundamentally, as a particular way of organizing knowledge”(Scarbrough, 1998, p. 137).
The process of gathering and sharing tacit experience, and articulating and codifying it
into explicit knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) involves exploring and exploiting
competencies both internal and external to the firm. Consider this process to be specified
as a knowledge production function (Griliches, 1979), such that
Kt = Kt−1 +R(E)− cθE, (1)
Kt = K0 + t · [R(E)− cθE] , (2)
where expertise E can be provided internally, as well as by sources external to the firm.
It is assumed that returns increase with expertise, such that ∂R∂E > 0. This reflects the
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notion that the more useful expertise is, the more it adds to the knowledge stock of the
firm.
Of course, there is a cost to accessing expertise. According to transaction cost eco-
nomics (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991), bounded rationality and opportunism raise issues
that lead to heterogenous transaction costs cθ among different types of organization θ. We
follow Audretsch et al. (1996) and focus on a ceteris paribus analysis of transaction costs
as a function of the degree of specificity, leaving other determinants such as uncertainty
and complexity aside. Therefore assume that expertise can vary in its specificity s. If s
is low, expertise is very generic. If s is high, it is very firm-specific. Williamson (1985)
argues that markets provide high-powered incentives and are better able to curtail bureau-
cratic distortion compared to internal organization and cooperation. However, control of
opportunistic behavior is most effective in a hierarchical organization. The risk of holdup
rises with specificity. A particular reason is that switching to alternative technologies and
modes of provision is costly (Whitten and Wakefield, 2006; Peukert, 2011). Accordingly,
we specify transaction costs according to
cθ,s =
(
1
α
s
)2
+ α, α =
1
1 + θ
, θ, s ∈ [0, 1] (3)
where θ is the outsourcing level.
The transformation of knowledge into new processes, products and services is finally
modeled as the probability that the stock of accumulated knowledge exceeds a certain
threshold level τ . Economically this may be interpreted as the net value of an invention:
If the invention is promising enough, the firm starts the implementation/places it on the
market.2 Hence, the probability to innovate is given by
Prob(Inno) = Prob(Kt > τ) = 1− Prob(Kt ≤ τ) = 1−
τ∫
−∞
f(y)dy ∀τ ∈ R (4)
where f : R→ [0,∞) is the pdf of K.
Following Williamson (1991) figure 1 compares the transaction costs of the three types
of organization in-house (‘hierarchy’, θ = 0), partial outsourcing (‘hybrid’, θ = 0.5) and
complete outsourcing (‘market’, θ = 1). Analogously, in the graphical representation of
equation (2) in figure 2, the optimal organizational form is defined by the envelope of the
three curves.3 Sourcing from the market is best when specificity is modest. For semi-
specific assets, a hybrid mode of organization is optimal, and in case of high specificity the
highest stock of knowledge is achieved in a hierarchical organization. Figure 3 shows the
relationship between outsourcing and knowledge production.4 Holding specificity fixed at
2Note that we are not considering any cost of implementation, such as liquidity constraints or advertising.
That is, we implicitly assume this cost Ct to be zero in Prob(Kt − Ct > τ).
3For simplicity we set K0 = 0, and t = E = 1, such that K = 1− cω,s ∀ω ∈ {H,X,M}.
4See figure A.2 for a plot of the three dimensions K, s and θ.
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Figure 1: Transaction costs
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Similar to Williamson (1991), Figure 1, p. 284.
Figure 2: Accumulated knowledge
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Figure 3: Accumulated knowledge as a function of the outsourcing level
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Accumulated knowledge K as a function the outsourcing level θ, holding asset specificity s fixed.
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a low level of s, the upper left panel indicates an steadily increasing relationship. Once we
increase s, this relationship changes. For intermediate values the relationship is inversely
U-shaped, for high values of s it is steadily decreasing.
Dependent on the level of specificity, the model suggests different functional forms for
the relation between knowledge production and the level of outsourcing. For low levels of
specificity the results point to an increasing relation (upper panel of figure 3). For medium
levels the model suggests a hump-shape and for high levels of specificity the model predicts
a decreasing relation.
4 Data and empirical specification
The empirical analysis is based on the ZEW ICT Survey, a telephone survey conducted
every three years with a special focus on diffusion and use of ICT in German companies.
While the data offer information on the use of ICT in the firm, we also observe variables
on innovation, personnel and human capital, export, industry affiliation and location. To
incorporate a time-lag needed for innovation to be created and successfully launched, and
to cover the potential issue of reverse causality, data from two waves is used. Innovation
variables are employed from the 2007 data and refer to the time span of 2004 to 2006.
Variables on IT outsourcing and controls are taken from the 2004 data and refer to 2003.
Due to item-nonresponse and panel attrition the sample size is 1582 observations. The
data allow to distinguish between product innovation and process innovation, where both
are defined to be new or markedly improved. The majority of firms in the sample has
been innovating during 2004 to 2006. About 59 percent report to have launched new
products and services, while roughly 66 percent report to have introduced improved or
new processes. Correspondingly, about one quarter has done both product and process
innovation.
Firms are asked whether they are using specific types of IT services j and indicate the
mode of provision: inhouse, partial outsourcing or complete outsourcing.5 That is, Sji is
defined as
Sji =

0, not in use
1, inhouse
2, outsourced partially
3, outsourced completely.
(5)
From this information we construct a firm-specific measure of the outsourcing ratio, defined
5Those IT services are installation of new hard- and software, system support and maintenance, support
help desk, software development, internet/web maintenance and design, IT training, IT security and on-
demand-computing.
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as the proportion of outsourced IT on total IT,
θ˜i,γ =
γ
Pi︷ ︸︸ ︷
J∑
j=1
I(Sji = 2) +
Ci︷ ︸︸ ︷
J∑
j=1
I(Sji = 3)
J∑
j=1
I(Sji > 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ti
, (6)
where I(·) is the indicator function. Because we do not know if ‘partial’ is 10% outsourcing
or 90% outsourcing, we assume a weight of γ ∈ (0, 1). Another issue becomes evident when
considering the following example. Firm a has only one IT service in use (Ta = 1), firm
b uses the whole range of IT services (Tb = J), both are complete outsourcers (Pa =
Pb = 0, Ca = 1, Cb = J). While those firms are clearly different, both exhibit the same
outsourcing ratio θ˜i,γ = 1. In order to consider the firm-specific importance of IT in our
measure of outsourcing, we weight θ˜i,γ with a measure of IT intensity ηi, such that
θi,γ = ηi · θ˜i,γ ∈ [0, 1]. (7)
We operationalize ηi with the percentage of computerized workplaces.
6 In the following
we use the term outsourcing ratio for θ˜i,γ and the term outsourcing level for θi,γ .
Treating the theoretical construct of the knowledge stock as a latent variable that is indi-
rectly observed in the decision to innovate (see equation 4), we estimate sets of probit mo-
dels. Two specifications each for product and process innovation and γ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9}
are used. The first is given as
innoi,t,γ = f(α+ βθi,t−1,γ + δ′xi,t−1 + εi,t,γ) (specification A)
where α, β, δ are (vectors of) coefficients and εi is an error term. To test the predictions
of our stylized theoretical model, we also estimate a quadratic specification, i.e.
innoi,t,γ = f(α+ β1θi,t−1,γ + β2θ2i,t−1,γ + δ
′xi,t−1 + εi,t,γ). (specification B)
As control variables xi we include:
Log employees: Audretsch and Acs (1991) and Acs et al. (1994), among others, show that
firm size is an important determinant of innovative activity.7 Kretschmer et al. (forthcom-
ing) consider the fact that firm scale (size) is endogenous to the innovation decision. We
6Descriptive statistics on IT intensity can be found in table 1.
7See Acs and Audretsch (2003) for a summary of key issues in the empirical literature in favor of a firm
size effect on innovation.
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measure size by the logarithm of the number of employees working for the firm in Ger-
many on average in 2003 (including apprentices and part-time employees and excluding
secondary labor force).
% University, Job training: A firm’s technological competence is crucial to innovation - as
a source of ideas, as a direct influence on R&D, and as a way to enable the capability to
adopt a new technology (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Hoffman et al., 1998). As modeled
above, technological competence is created endogenously by accumulation of knowledge in
a continuous process of learning in production (Cantwell and Fai, 1999). We control for
two types of human capital: Formal education, i.e. the proportion of staff with a university
degree, and firm-specific human capital, i.e. a dummy for job training (Bauernschuster
et al., 2009).
Business situation: Innovation can occur pro- and anticyclically (Mowery and Rosenberg,
1979; Geroski and Walters, 1995). On the one hand, newly introduced products compete
for customer spending. Within a boom situation the market grows and can therefore ab-
sorb more new products in a given period of time without reducing the profitability of each.
Firms will therefore place their innovative products when demand is high or expected to
rise. On the other hand, in a recession, a decrease of existing rents relative to expected
returns of innovation represents an incentive to innovate. Moreover, the implementation
of new processes requires to divert resources from operational to strategic tasks, which is
less costly in a recession when current activities are relatively less profitable.
Export: The openness of a firm, i.e. access to remote markets, acts as a multiplier of in-
novation drivers surrounding the firm (Eaton and Kortum, 2006). The firm is faced with
increased market pressure resulting from a relative increase in the number of competitors
compared to the home market. Moreover, export activity expands the boundaries of the
(national) innovation network (cf. Bertschek, 1995). That is, openness adds sources of
knowledge (Baldwin and Gu, 2004). It should be noted that export is likely to be en-
dogenous (Kirbach and Schmiedeberg, 2008; Becker and Egger, forthcoming). We neglect
this issue since we are more interested in exports as a control variable than in a causal
interpretation of the coefficient. Our measure is a dummy variable coded one if firms
report to have exported in 2003, zero otherwise.
East Germany: Taking a macro location effect into consideration, we aim at controlling
for persistent differences between Eastern and Western Germany in terms of resources, in-
novation and productivity (Lehmann et al., 2004; Audretsch et al., forthcoming; Smolny,
forthcoming).
Industry dummies: To control for heterogeneity among industries, dummies for 14 indus-
tries, classified according to two-digit NACE codes are included.8
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Outsourcing level
In-house Low Medium Complete
θγ < 0.2 0.2 ≤ θγ < 0.5 0.5 ≤ θγ < 0.8 θγ ≥ 0.8
γ = 0.3
Product innovation 0.583 (0.493) 0.640 (0.481) 0.426 (0.497) 0.489 (0.505)
Process innovation 0.659 (0.474) 0.661 (0.474) 0.585 (0.495) 0.702 (0.462)
Log employees 3.975 (1.643) 3.687 (1.560) 3.062 (1.387) 2.342 (1.026)
% University 0.135 (0.225) 0.162 (0.235) 0.225 (0.300) 0.154 (0.273)
Job training 0.824 (0.381) 0.880 (0.325) 0.798 (0.404) 0.872 (0.337)
Business situation 0.663 (0.473) 0.664 (0.473) 0.670 (0.473) 0.553 (0.503)
Export 0.510 (0.500) 0.482 (0.500) 0.277 (0.450) 0.213 (0.414)
East 0.278 (0.448) 0.278 (0.449) 0.234 (0.426) 0.170 (0.380)
IT intensity η 0.393 (0.325) 0.657 (0.272) 0.831 (0.163) 0.971 (0.067)
Observations 1099 342 94 47
γ = 0.6
Product innovation 0.562 (0.496) 0.670 (0.471) 0.493 (0.502) 0.463 (0.503)
Process innovation 0.637 (0.481) 0.696 (0.461) 0.642 (0.481) 0.685 (0.469)
Log employees 3.901 (1.633) 3.951 (1.623) 3.347 (1.504) 2.330 (0.984)
% University 0.119 (0.216) 0.179 (0.240) 0.221 (0.291) 0.150 (0.258)
Job training 0.803 (0.398) 0.895 (0.307) 0.845 (0.364) 0.889 (0.317)
Business situation 0.659 (0.474) 0.661 (0.474) 0.703 (0.459) 0.574 (0.499)
Export 0.495 (0.500) 0.538 (0.499) 0.324 (0.470) 0.204 (0.407)
East 0.278 (0.448) 0.263 (0.441) 0.297 (0.459) 0.167 (0.376)
IT intensity η 0.337 (0.308) 0.636 (0.260) 0.852 (0.152) 0.975 (0.063)
Observations 923 457 148 54
γ = 0.9
Product innovation 0.546 (0.498) 0.678 (0.468) 0.557 (0.498) 0.479 (0.502)
Process innovation 0.626 (0.484) 0.705 (0.457) 0.655 (0.477) 0.667 (0.474)
Log employees 3.827 (1.620) 4.067 (1.631) 3.635 (1.638) 2.737 (1.213)
% University 0.107 (0.210) 0.174 (0.231) 0.195 (0.268) 0.246 (0.310)
Job training 0.787 (0.410) 0.892 (0.311) 0.866 (0.342) 0.917 (0.278)
Business situation 0.644 (0.479) 0.674 (0.469) 0.711 (0.454) 0.635 (0.484)
Export 0.488 (0.500) 0.547 (0.498) 0.412 (0.494) 0.240 (0.429)
East 0.282 (0.450) 0.264 (0.441) 0.278 (0.449) 0.208 (0.408)
IT intensity η 0.307 (0.302) 0.575 (0.258) 0.832 (0.152) 0.967 (0.058)
Observations 811 481 194 96
Means are reported, standard deviation in parentheses.
Product and process innovation between 2004 and 2006 (0/1).
Natural logarithm of the average number of employees in 2003 (apprentices and part-timers included).
Percentage of employees holding a university degree compared to all employees on average in 2003.
Employees have attended any type of job training in 2003 (0/1).
Good/rather good business situation (0/1) at the time of the interview (2004).
Firm has exported in 2003 (0/1).
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5 Results
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for a categorization of outsourcing levels. Follow-
ing Lacity et al. (2009), we distinguish between In-house (θγ < 0.2), Low (0.2 ≤ θγ < 0.5),
Medium (0.5 ≤ θγ < 0.8) and Complete (θγ ≥ 0.8). The distribution is skewed to the right.
That is, dependent on the assumed weight of ’partial’, in between 30% to 50% of the firms
in our sample resort to IT outsourcing. Most strikingly, looking at the means reveals that
the proportion of innovating firms varies significantly across classes of outsourcing lev-
els. Independent of γ, the descriptive statistics suggest a non-linear relationship between
product innovation and the outsourcing level, where the maximum is at levels in between
0.2 and 0.5. Minima can be found at levels in between 0.5 and 1. The picture for process
innovation is less clear, but a general positive correlation with fluctuations is visible. Firms
relying on higher levels of outsourcing seem to be smaller in size, report a worse business
situation, have a lower propensity to export and are more often located in East Germany.
Further, the descriptive statistics reveal a positive correlation between the percentage of
employees with an university degree and the outsourcing level. For moderate levels of γ
maxima are at outsourcing levels in between 0.5 and 0.8. The proportion of firms with
employees in on-the-job training varies across classes of the outsourcing level as well. The
data suggest an overall positive correlation, however, there is a kink for outsourcing levels
in between 0.5 and 0.8.
Estimation results according to specification A are reported in table 2. The coefficients
of our control variables are strikingly similar across all values of γ. Therefore the tables
only report coefficients for models with γ = 0.3, γ = 0.6 and γ = 0.9. In figure 4 the
coefficient of outsourcing (βˆ) and the corresponding 90% confidence band is plotted as a
function of γ. Regardless of the parameter γ, there is no significant effect of outsourcing
on the probability of product innovation in this specification (see left hand panel of figure
4). Concerning the control variables, the results depicted in the top row of table 2 are
intuitive. The estimates suggest that firm size is a significantly positive predictor of
product innovation. A higher fraction of employees with an university degree also increases
the probability of product innovation. Firm-specific human capital is not significant for
higher values of γ. Our estimates suggest that investment in innovation is pro-cyclical.
Export is highly significant and positive. We do not find a significant difference between
East and West German firms. Concerning process innovation, the right hand panel of
figure 4 indicates a significantly positive effect of outsourcing when setting 0.4 ≤ γ ≤ 0.9.
That is, on a very reasonable interval, independent of how we operationalize ’partial
outsourcing’, external technology supply has a positive and significant effect on client-side
process innovation. Also the estimated coefficients for the control variables reported in the
bottom row of table 2 are different compared to the results for product innovation. Formal
education does not play a significant role here. At the same time firm-specific knowledge
8See Table A.1 in the appendix for an industry classification.
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Table 2: Probit models for specification A
γ = 0.3 γ = 0.6 γ = 0.9
Product innovation
Outsourcing level 0.2064 (1.13) 0.2160 (1.28) 0.2022 (1.35)
Log employees 0.0961∗∗∗ (3.91) 0.0958∗∗∗ (3.92) 0.0949∗∗∗ (3.91)
% University 0.0054∗∗∗ (3.20) 0.0054∗∗∗ (3.14) 0.0053∗∗∗ (3.10)
Job training 0.1669∗ (1.69) 0.1627 (1.64) 0.1603 (1.61)
Business situation 0.1906∗∗∗ (2.61) 0.1907∗∗∗ (2.61) 0.1907∗∗∗ (2.61)
Export 0.6308∗∗∗ (7.77) 0.6280∗∗∗ (7.73) 0.6261∗∗∗ (7.70)
East -0.1132 (-1.45) -0.1139 (-1.46) -0.1151 (-1.47)
Constant -0.9906∗∗∗ (-5.68) -1.0004∗∗∗ (-5.72) -1.0016∗∗∗ (-5.74)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -9.1e+02 -9.1e+02 -9.1e+02
χ2 274.2910 274.8184 275.2097
Pseudo-R2 0.1559 0.1561 0.1562
Observations 1582 1582 1582
Process innovation
Outsourcing level 0.2864 (1.61) 0.3351∗∗ (2.04) 0.3369∗∗ (2.31)
Log employees 0.1761∗∗∗ (6.95) 0.1768∗∗∗ (7.03) 0.1761∗∗∗ (7.04)
% University -0.0001 (-0.04) -0.0002 (-0.15) -0.0004 (-0.22)
Job training 0.3471∗∗∗ (3.69) 0.3390∗∗∗ (3.60) 0.3333∗∗∗ (3.53)
Business situation 0.2804∗∗∗ (3.90) 0.2809∗∗∗ (3.90) 0.2812∗∗∗ (3.90)
Export -0.0021 (-0.03) -0.0072 (-0.09) -0.0113 (-0.14)
East -0.2297∗∗∗ (-3.04) -0.2295∗∗∗ (-3.04) -0.2307∗∗∗ (-3.05)
Constant -0.9347∗∗∗ (-5.56) -0.9621∗∗∗ (-5.71) -0.9742∗∗∗ (-5.81)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -9.3e+02 -9.3e+02 -9.3e+02
χ2 161.5773 162.9138 164.0155
Pseudo-R2 0.0858 0.0866 0.0871
Observations 1582 1582 1582
z statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The dependent variables are product innovation and process innovation between 2004 and 2006 (0/1).
Proportion of outsourced IT on total IT weighted by the percentage of computerized workplaces,
where γ gives the weight of ‘partial’ (see section 4).
See table A.1 for an industry classification, ‘other business-related services’ is the omitted category.
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(measured by job training) seems to be a significant predictor of process innovation. Also,
firms in East Germany have a significantly lower probability of process innovation.9
Estimation results according to specification B are reported in table 3. Again, coeffi-
cients for control variables are strikingly similar across all values of γ. Therefore the tables
only report coefficients for models with γ = 0.3, γ = 0.6 and γ = 0.9. Figure 5 plots the
coefficients of the outsourcing level (βˆ1, βˆ2) and the corresponding 90% confidence band
as a function of γ. For product innovation (left hand panel) we find significant effects
when setting 0.4 ≤ γ ≤ 0.9. The corresponding signs of the coefficients indicate an inverse
U-shape.10 The corresponding maximum is at an outsourcing level of about 0.5.
The right hand panel of figure 5 indicates similar, yet insignificant estimates of βˆ1 and
βˆ2 for process innovation. In consequence, we are unable to confirm an inversely U-shaped
relation of outsourcing and process innovation. For both models, coefficient estimates of
control variables are not largely different from those in specification A.
Overall, these results are robust to a number of different specifications. First, compa-
rable results can be found when lagged innovation variables are included as indepen-
dent variables, testing a ’success breeds success’ hypothesis (Flaig and Stadler, 1994;
Peters, 2009). Second, to account for interdependencies between different types of in-
novation (Kretschmer et al., forthcoming), we estimated a simultaneous bivariate pro-
bit model to allow the error terms of both equations to be correlated. Third, we tried
to tackle the possible issue of non-random selection into outsourcing more explicitly.
With information on whether the firm has considered consultancy with regard to the
Y2K problem in the late 1990s (see Ohnemus (2007) for a detailed description), the
dataset offered a reasonably good instrument for our measure of outsourcing. However,
we still lacked a second exclusion restriction. Coding the outsourcing variable discretely
((θγ < 0.2) = 0, (0.2 ≤ θγ < 0.8) = 1, (θγ > 0.8) = 2) and estimating separate bivariate
probit models for in-house vs. partial, in-house vs. complete and partial vs. complete
allowed us to correct for endogeneity using only one exclusion restriction. Because re-
sults obtained in this setting are comparable, we chose to show the most straightforward
specification here. We are aware that this doesn’t allow to establish causality.
6 Discussion
To sum up, we find a positive relation between innovation and the outsourcing level. That
is, our specification indicates a positive effect of outsourcing on process innovation and a
hump-shaped effect of outsourcing on product innovation.11
9In some sense, this is in line with the literature on productivity gaps between East and West Germany.
See for example Smolny (forthcoming).
10A test with the null of a U-shape (negative slope at the lower bound and positive slope at the upper bound)
or monotone function (sign of the slope is equal at both bounds) can be rejected for γ > 0.4. See Lind
and Mehlum (2010) for a description of the test.
11The fact that the coefficients are insignificant in the respective other specification can be explained by
looking at the descriptive statistics in table 1. First, the proportion of firms that report product innovation
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Figure 4: Estimated probit coefficients βˆ(γ), product and process innovation (specification A)
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to specification A without squared term.
Figure 5: Estimated probit coefficients βˆ1(γ), βˆ2(γ), product and process innovation
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Table 3: Probit models for specification B
γ = 0.3 γ = 0.6 γ = 0.9
Product innovation
Outsourcing level 0.8121∗ (1.73) 1.1906∗∗∗ (2.62) 1.5113∗∗∗ (3.46)
Outsourcing level2 -0.8017 (-1.35) -1.2637∗∗ (-2.22) -1.5842∗∗∗ (-3.08)
Log employees 0.0931∗∗∗ (3.77) 0.0866∗∗∗ (3.50) 0.0797∗∗∗ (3.22)
% University 0.0054∗∗∗ (3.19) 0.0054∗∗∗ (3.19) 0.0056∗∗∗ (3.29)
Job training 0.1602 (1.62) 0.1536 (1.54) 0.1520 (1.52)
Business situation 0.1872∗∗ (2.56) 0.1849∗∗ (2.53) 0.1831∗∗ (2.50)
Export 0.6238∗∗∗ (7.67) 0.6128∗∗∗ (7.52) 0.6030∗∗∗ (7.38)
East -0.1188 (-1.52) -0.1239 (-1.59) -0.1256 (-1.61)
Constant -1.0151∗∗∗ (-5.78) -1.0316∗∗∗ (-5.88) -1.0407∗∗∗ (-5.97)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Slope lower bound 0.8121∗∗ (1.73) 1.1906∗∗∗ (2.62) 1.5113∗∗∗ (3.46)
Slope upper bound -0.7913 (-1.02) -1.3367∗∗ (-1.80) -1.6571∗∗∗ (-2.60)
Extreme point 0.5065 0.4711 0.4770
90% Fieller-CI out of range [0.3594, 0.8335] [0.3985, 0.6186]
U-test 1.02 1.81∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗
Log likelihood -9.1e+02 -9.0e+02 -9.0e+02
χ2 274.7983 277.7270 281.6255
Pseudo-R2 0.1569 0.1587 0.1610
Observations 1582 1582 1582
Process innovation
Outsourcing level 0.1874 (0.41) 0.3634 (0.83) 0.3092 (0.73)
Outsourcing level2 0.1333 (0.24) -0.0374 (-0.07) 0.0343 (0.07)
Log employees 0.1766∗∗∗ (6.93) 0.1765∗∗∗ (6.91) 0.1764∗∗∗ (6.90)
% University -0.0001 (-0.04) -0.0002 (-0.15) -0.0004 (-0.22)
Job training 0.3481∗∗∗ (3.70) 0.3387∗∗∗ (3.59) 0.3335∗∗∗ (3.53)
Business situation 0.2809∗∗∗ (3.90) 0.2808∗∗∗ (3.90) 0.2814∗∗∗ (3.90)
Export -0.0009 (-0.01) -0.0077 (-0.10) -0.0107 (-0.13)
East -0.2289∗∗∗ (-3.02) -0.2298∗∗∗ (-3.04) -0.2305∗∗∗ (-3.05)
Constant -0.9308∗∗∗ (-5.51) -0.9629∗∗∗ (-5.70) -0.9736∗∗∗ (-5.80)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Slope lower bound 0.1874 0.3633 0.3092
Slope upper bound 0.4540 0.2886 0.3777
Extreme point -0.7028 4.8600 -4.5110
90% Fieller-CI out of range out of range out of range
U-test trivial rejection trivial rejection trivial rejection
Log likelihood -9.3e+02 -9.3e+02 -9.3e+02
χ2 161.5438 163.2040 164.1084
Pseudo-R2 0.0858 0.0866 0.0871
Observations 1582 1582 1582
z statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Slope lower bound = β1 + 2β2 · 0, slope upper bound=β1 + 2β2 · 1.
Extreme point = −β1/2β2. U-test according to Lind and Mehlum (2010).
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Our stylized theoretical model implies both results, dependent on the specificity of
knowledge underlying the innovation decision. The upper panel of figure 3, with low values
of specificity, suggests a monotonically increasing relation between knowledge growth and
the level of outsourcing. A hump-shaped and monotonically decreasing relationship is
implied in the lower panel of figure 3, where higher levels of specificity are depicted.
Although a limitation of the empirical analysis presented here is that specificity cannot be
measured directly, we argue that it provides some evidence for the theoretical reasoning
above. Inspired by Barras (1986), innovation can be seen as a cycle that starts with
process improvements to increase efficiency to go on with process innovations that increase
quality, and finally stimulates the development of new products and services. In each
stage, more specific knowledge is needed to reach the next stage. In essence we argue that
sproc < sprod, i.e. product innovation and process innovation differ in terms of knowledge
specificity. Hence, if the knowledge needed to generate IT-enabled product innovation is
more specific than the knowledge needed to generate IT-enabled process innovation, the
empirical results fit the results of our stylized theoretical model quite well. Our results are
in line with the study by Gooroochurn and Hanley (2007) who find that the probability
to outsource process innovation is twice as high as product innovation in UK Community
Innovation Survey data.
To see why there are different effects on product and process innovation in the specific
setting of IT outsourcing, consider the case study discussed by Kumar and Snavely (2004)
as an example. A company from the printing industry decided to develop a new internet-
based service that allows its customers to individualize their print projects. Mainly due to
a lack of internal competence, the implementation was outsourced and became a success.
The outsourcing contract implied that the external vendor was integrated in the internal
management process, i.e. it was a partial outsourcing relationship. Kumar and Snavely
(2004) stress that vendor-client cooperation was the key driver of success in this case.
This example shows that IT-enabled product innovation can be very firm-specific. In a
recent study using micro-level data on providers of knowledge-intensive business services,
Engelsta¨tter and Sarbu (2010) underline this argument from a different perspective. The
authors find that enterprise software, specifically developed for the firm, has a positive
impact on the probability of service (i.e. product) innovation. Less customized, industry-
specific software, however, turns out to have no significant impact on service innovation.
A common reason why firms use standardized software aims at improvements in produc-
tivity and flexibility instead of increasing demand. If IT is widely used for operational
tasks, improvements in technology are very likely to have effects on business processes.
Hence, by the nature of expertise needed to develop standardized vs. customized software
solutions, IT-enabled process innovation should be easier achieved than IT-enabled prod-
at the lower end of the outsourcing level does not largely differ from those at the upper end. Second,
although there is a kink in the proportion of firms reporting process innovation for a medium level of
outsourcing, differences between the lower and the upper end are rather substantial. Figures A.3, A.4, A.5
in the appendix further illustrate our findings.
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uct innovation. Another explanation why we don’t observe a tipping point in our results
for process innovation is a difference in the required vendor-client coordination. Weeks
and Feeny (2008) argue that in the case of process innovation, soft factors like trust and
communication are less critical for success. Hence, outsourcing too much is less harmful.
7 Conclusion
While the market for external supply of IT has seen rapid growth during the last decade,
scientific research has been largely silent on an important long run aspect of client-side
effects so far. It is well known that IT enabled innovation is an important source of value
creation for firms operating in globalized markets and increasingly individualized cus-
tomer desires. However it remains unclear if innovation can be achieved in IT outsourcing
relationships.
We employ a stylized theoretical model based on transaction cost economics to explore
knowledge creation across the boundaries of the firm. The model suggests that knowledge
growth, and therefore innovation, depends on the specificity of knowledge and the scope
of outsourcing decisions. When the knowledge needed to generate innovation is not very
specific, completely outsourcing knowledge production is always better than cooperation
or in-house production. For intermediate levels of specificity, however, the optimal mode
of organization is a hybrid one. When required knowledge is more specific, in-house pro-
duction is optimal. Our empirical strategy involves to test the theoretical predictions with
German micro-data. Following a knowledge production function approach, we estimate
probit models for product and process innovation. By combining several variables, we
construct a measure of the firm-specific importance of IT outsourcing, reflecting both ex-
ternal supply of IT services and firm-specific IT intensity. We find a positive linear effect
on process innovation, and a hump-shaped effect on product innovation. We argue that
innovation can be seen as a multi-stage process of improvements in efficiency and quality
that finally stimulates the development of new products and services. In consequence the
specificity of knowledge needed is increasing in each stage. That is, if knowledge needed
to generate process innovation is less specific than knowledge required to generate prod-
uct innovation, the empirical results fit the results of our stylized theoretical model quite
well, although we cannot observe asset specificity directly. We are aware that we cannot
establish causality in this analysis. Future work should try to address this issue, directly
incorporate the underlying specificity of knowledge in the empirical analysis and possibly
control for vendor-specific effects. Another extension could be to investigate the perfor-
mance implications of innovation, i.e. differentiate quantity and quality of innovation.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Industry classification
Industry NACE
Consumer goods 15–22, 36–37
Chemical industry 23–24
Other raw materials 25–27
Metal and machine construction 28–29
Electrical engineering 30–32
Precision instruments 33
Automobile 34–35
Wholesale trade 51
Retail trade 50, 52
Transportation and postal services 60–63, 64.1
Banks and insurances 65–67
Electronic processing and telecommunication 72, 64.2
Technical services 73, 74.2, 74.3
Other business-related services 70–71, 74.1, 74.4–74.8, 90
Source: Ohnemus (2007).
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Figure A.1: IT outsourcing in the EU15 countries in 2007
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Figure A.2: Accumulated knowledge as a function of the outsourcing level and specificity
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Figure A.3: Predicted probability of product innovation, γ=0.3, γ=0.6, γ=0.7
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Predicted probability p̂rod as a function of θ, and 90% confidence interval, according to
specification A without squared term. All covariates fixed at the mean.
Figure A.4: Predicted probability of process innovation, γ=0.3, γ=0.6, γ=0.7
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Predicted probability p̂roc as a function of θ, and 90% confidence interval, according to
specification A without squared term. All covariates fixed at the mean.
Figure A.5: Predicted probability of product innovation, γ=0.3, γ=0.6, γ=0.7
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Predicted probability p̂rod as a function of θ, and 90% confidence interval, according to
specification B with squared term. All covariates fixed at the mean.
Figure A.6: Predicted probability of process innovation, γ=0.3, γ=0.6, γ=0.7
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Predicted probability p̂roc as a function of θ, and 90% confidence interval, according to
specification B with squared term. All covariates fixed at the mean.
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